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Abstract: 
 
The real estate literature has been puzzled by the story of why a tax-exempt vehicle like REITs 
uses more debt than equity. We used empirical evidence on REITs and real estate operating 
companies (REOCs) in Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong from 2006 to 2010 and verified that 
REITs did use more debt than REOCs, despite borrowing constraints imposed on REITs in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. REITs also used more short-term debt to finance their real estate 
investment activities, but their total debt level declined during the crisis periods in 2007 and 
2008. We found that higher long-term debt reduced the price over net asset value ratio (P/NAV), 
while short-term debt increased P/NAV of the real estate firms during normal times. However, 
the leverage effects of both the long-term and short-term debts were reversed when the credit 
crunch occurred in 2007 and 2008. Our study provides a better understanding of how REITs in 
Asia strategically employ larger amounts of short-term debt funding during normal times due to 
the lower funding cost, and not for tax or signaling reasons. However, during a financial credit 
crunch, REITs that do not substitute short-term debt by long-term debt are exposed to huge 
refinancing risks and their stock prices are heavily discounted. The results are in line with a 
strategic pecking order of first using cheap short-term funding and reversing into equity funding 
when debt cost rises. Our results do not support the tax and signaling effect, but are consistent 
with the clientele effect.  
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Leverage Strategies of Asian REITs and Real Estate Operating Companies 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The exodus of financial institutions in the aftermath of the US subprime crisis has caused serious 
liquidity crunch to the global debt markets. Banks and financial institutions were reluctant to 
extend credit facilities to real estate firms. Many real estate firms faced serious delinquency risks 
for failure to obtain refinancing of their matured debts, though interest rates remained relatively 
low. In September 2008, New City Residence Investment, a residential real estate investment 
trust (REIT) in Japan, filed for bankruptcy under the Civil Rehabilitation Act (2000) with 
liabilities totaling US$1.1 billion (112.4 billion yen)1 Despite the strong performance of its 
portfolio with a healthy average occupancy rate of 93.4 percent at the end of September 2008, it 
was delisted on 10 November 2008. In May 2009, Joint Corp, a Japanese apartment developer, 
filed for bankruptcy protection after being saddled with liabilities of U$1.7 billion (168 billion 
yen).2 
 
The credit crisis has exposed the vulnerability of real estate firms that are highly leveraged. In 
good times, borrowed funds help to multiply the firms’ equity returns by several folds. However, 
the “leverage” effect cuts the opposite way when funding environment deteriorates wiping out 
large amountsof firm equity in a short time. Leverage is thus a “double-edge sword”3, which 
needs to be handled with great care.  
 
One puzzling phenomenon, which has attracted strong research interests, is the financing strategy 
of REITs which are ubiquitously structured as tax-exempt vehicles (Howe and Shilling, 1988; 
Brown and Riddiough, 2003). As REITs do not benefit from debt tax shield, they seem to 
contradict the capital structure theory in finance literature by heavily leveraging up their capital 
instead of raising more equity via secondary public offerings. Unlike many earlier studies that 
use data in a single REIT industry, we compare the financing strategies of REITs with those of 
                                                            
1    Taku Kato and Mari Murayama, “New City REIT Files Bankruptcy with $1.1 Billion Debt”, Bloomberg News, 
October 9, 2008.  
2  Gregory Turk and Yasuke Miyazawa, “Join, Japanese Developer, Files for Bankruptcy,” Bloomberg New, May 
29, 2009,   
3  Leverage is a double-edged sword. High debt level increases risk-adjusted returns of REIT on one hand; but 
also increases market betas of the REITs on the other hand (Allen et al., 2000; and Chan et al., 1990). 
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another seemingly unrelated but comparable vehicle in securitized real estate markets, which is 
highly prominent in Asia – public listed real estate operating companies (REOCs). 
 
REOCs, which consist mainly of real estate development companies, are the only securitized real 
estate vehicle in the markets prior to the debut of REITs in Asia in 2001. The first Asian REIT 
was Nippon Building Fund, which was traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in September 2001. 
In a short span of 10 years, the Asian REIT markets have grown by leaps and bounds into a huge 
market with a total number of 123 REITs and a total market capitalization of US$95 billion as of 
the end of December 2010 (CBRE Research, 2011). Its combined market capitalization makes it 
the second largest REIT market in the world after the US REIT market. The three largest Asian 
REIT markets are Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong, ranked in a descending order by market 
capitalization.4  
 
In Asia, REOCs and REITs had relied considerably on debt financing for their investments in 
real estate markets. These companies faced immense refinancing risks when the capital markets 
were badly hit by shrinking credit supply during the global financial crisis that started in 2007. 
Stock prices of real estate firms dipped sharply depressing the stock price to net asset value 
(P/NAV) ratio to as low as 63% in 2008 (Figure 1). Are the large P/NAV discounts correlated 
with aggressive leveraging strategies of these two real estate firms prior to the crisis? Are the 
P/NAV discounts driven by market sentiment of “noisy” retail investors, who trade based on 
their herd instinct? The 2007 crisis offers a natural experiment to study the impact leveraging 
strategies of the two securitized real estate vehicles and their responses in terms of P/NAV 
discounts in the recent financing crisis. Using the two seemingly unrelated types of  real estate 
firms in our tests, we hope to be able to better understand differences, if any, in the rationales 
behind the heavy reliance of debt financing by these two types of  real estate firms.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
                                                            
4   Japanese REIT market had 35 listed REITs with a total market capitalization of US$45.63 billion constituting 
48 percent of the total market capitalization. Singapore and Hong Kong have the 2nd and 3rd largest markets in 
Asia with approximately US$29.3 billion (24 listed REITs) and US$12.2 billion (8 listed REITs), respectively, 
as of the end of 2010.  
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Our study uses empirical data on REITs and REOCs in Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong from 
2006 to 2010 including the subprime crisis periods in 2007 and 2008. We found that REITs used 
more debt than REOCs, despite borrowing constraints imposed on REITs in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. They also used more short-term debt to finance their real estate investment activities. 
The total debt level of REITs declined during the crisis periods. Consistent with the findings in 
earlier studies, we find positive correlations between total debt levels and the P/NAV of real 
estate firms. Dividing the total debt into a long-term debt and a short-term debt, we find that 
higher long-term debt reduced price over net asset value ratio (P/NAV), while short-term debt 
increased P/NAV of the real estate firms during normal times. However, the leverage effects, 
both long-term and short, were reversed when the credit crunch occurred in 2007 and 2008. Our 
study provides a better understanding of how REITs in Asia strategically employ larger amounts 
of short-term debt funding during normal times due to the lower funding cost, and not for tax or 
signaling reasons. However, during a financial credit crunch, REITs that do not move quickly 
into long-term debt are exposed to huge refinancing risks and their stock prices are heavily 
discounted. Our results do not support the tax and signaling effect, but are consistent with the 
clientele effect. The results are also in line with a strategic pecking order of first using cheap 
short-term funding and reversing into equity funding when debt cost rises. 
 
The study makes contributions to the real estate literature in two aspects. First, it helps us to 
understand how leveraging strategies are adopted by managers in firms with heavy investments 
in real estate, but subject to different institutional constraints. Unlike the earlier studies that use 
single industry data, we use two seemingly unrelated vehicles from a single real estate industry 
to test if they are different in terms of leveraging decisions. Both REOCs and REITs are 
significantly involved in real estate investment business. Our results, however, show significant 
variations in the use of debt between REITs and REOCs, which are subject to different 
institutional constraints in their funding and investment activities. Second, we use the financial 
shocks as our natural experiment, and also use the instrumental variable approach in a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) setting to deliberately disentangle the endogeneity between leverage ratio 
and P/NAV in our tests. Our results show significant impact of leveraging strategies on P/NAV 
in real estate firms. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature on 
financing strategies of securitized real estate firms. Section 3 compares the structures of the two 
types of securitized real estate firms, and also gives a brief overview of the three major Asian 
REIT markets in Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Section 4 describes the data sources and 
descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the empirical methodologies. Section 6 presents the 
analyses of the results. Section 7 concludes the study.    
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Howe and Shilling (1988) argued that REITs with a tax-exempt status should reduce the use of 
debt in their capital structure. They use signalling hypothesis to explain the positive stock price 
reaction to debt offerings and the negative stock price reaction to equity issuances by REITs. 
Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans (2001) and Elyan, Myer and Li (2004) found a positive significant 
reaction to announcements of debt offers by REITs supporting the signal hypothesis of Howe 
and Shilling (1988). Jaffe (1991) disagreed with the “using less debt” hypothesis of Howe and 
Shilling (1988), and instead, he argued that the disadvantage of REITs in using debt could be 
cancelled off by the borrowing and lending activities of tax-paying REIT investors, who may 
enjoy tax shelter benefits. He showed that after-tax cash flows of REOCs and REITs were 
invariant to leverage, and REITs were found to be more highly levered than industry firms. 
Jaffe’s results were also supported by Hamil (1993), when non-recourse debt was used by 
REITs. 
 
Brown and Riddiough (2003) showed that REITs used public debt to reconfigure their capital 
structure, such that they retained the target debt ratio. REITs with high pre-offer levels of 
secured debt preferred to issue equity, whereas public debt was favoured by REITs with high 
pre-offer levels of unsecured debt. The results are consistent with the trade-off hypothesis in the 
capital structure theory. Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) found in contrary that the trade-off 
theory did not apply to REITs that were tax-exempt. They argued that debt strategies are related 
to the growth opportunities and market valuation of REITs. Ooi, Ong and Li (2010) showed that 
REITs time the public debt issuances to meet their long-term target debt ratio, and their findings 
supported the market timing hypothesis. Hardin and Wu (2010) found that although REITs with 
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strong banking relationship could gain easy access to public debt market,  these REITs used less 
secured debt, and instead they relied on the banking relationships to obtain more unsecured debt. 
The result is consistent with the clientele hypothesis (Maris and Elayan, 1991).   
 
Gau and Wang (1990) examined the determinants of financing property-based transactions in 
Vancouver, and they found that firms’ use of debt were dependent on tax-shields, cost of 
financial distress, and spread in interest rates. Maris and Elyan (1990) studied the debt preference 
of REITs, and found that large equity REITs with high growth rate used more debt than REITs 
facing more uncertainty in future cash flows. Ooi (1999) examined the choice between long-term 
versus short-term debts for UK property firms, and he found that large firms, with high return 
and focus in property trading employed more long-term debt. Harrison, Panasian and Seiler 
(2011) found that the leveraging strategies of REITs were dependent on the real estate type and 
location. 
 
What is the potential impact of financial leveraging on performance of firms in terms of their net 
asset valuation? Barkham and Ward (1999) found that the use of increasing leverage also 
increases the NAV discount for listed property firms in the UK. The same evidence was found 
by Bond and Shilling (2004) and Brouner and ter-Laak (2005) when they studied European 
property firms. They found that assets of European property firms with low debt levels are 
valued higher than assets owned by comparable firms with high debt levels. The same evidence 
was found by Anderson et al. (2001), whereby REITs traded at premiums to NAV tended to have 
lower levels of debt. Highly levered REITs are more sensitive to changes in interest rates and 
market conditions, and their earnings are also more volatile.  
 
The current literature is still divided with respects to REITs’ strategies on leveraging and optimal 
capital structure. This study is intended to fill in two potential gaps in the existing literature. Is 
high leveraging strategy unique to REITs, or the use of more debt is the norm for real estate 
intensive firms? First, we hope to understand whether REITs’ financing choice is affected by 
their tax-exempt status (Howe and Shilling, 1988; and Jaffe, 1991), or simply by the investments 
in real estate. Unlike the early studies that used single industry data from REIT, we used two 
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seemingly unrelated real estate firms5 to deal with the colinearity between investing in real estate 
and organization form of REITs in financing decisions. Second, the causality of financial 
leveraging on price to NAV discount in securitized real estate industry is potentially endogenous. 
We use instrumental approach to sever the reverse causality from price/NAV discount to 
leveraging decisions of securitized real estate firms. The financial shocks are also a good 
treatment to test real estate firms’ response via changing their leveraging strategies and the 
impact on P/NAV of the firms. 
 
3. Asian Securitized Real Estate Markets: REITs and REOCs 
 
Prior to 2001, REOC was the only securitized real estate channel for firms involved in real estate 
investment and development businesses to raise fund in the capital markets. These firms 
comprise large conglomerates that undertake a whole range of real estate development activities 
ranging from land acquisition, construction, investment and asset management to redevelopment 
and disposal. They typically hold a portfolio of commercial real estate projects that generate 
stable long-term rental incomes. 
 
The Asian real estate market landscape underwent structural changes after REITs were 
introduced in 2001. Developers sponsor the listing of REITs and inject commercial real estate 
from their books into the REITs via arm-length open market transfers. REITs open up a new 
avenue for them to unlock undervalued assets in their books. The high yield and regular dividend 
payout features of REITs attract strong interests from both institutional and retail investors as an 
alternative form of liquid real estate investments. The REIT expansion picked up momentum in 
Japan and Singapore in 2003 and 2004. In Hong Kong, the government via the Hong Kong 
Housing Authority used a REIT vehicle to privatize a portfolio of state-owned retail real estate 
and carparks in November 2005.6  
 
                                                            
5  Delcoure and Dickens (2004) found that REIT betas were related to business risk, whereas the betas of REOCs 
are positively related to agency costs. The betas were found to have differing sensitivity to real estate property 
type and regional location. 
6  The first Hong Kong REIT, known as Link REIT, was dubbed as the world’s largest initial public offering 
(IPO) of a REIT and the biggest privatization project in Hong Kong when they were concurrently launched in 
Hong Kong and globally in 2005. 
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The ubiquitous rules that define a REIT are applicable to Asian REITs though with slight 
variations across the markets (See Appendix 1). REITs in Asia are bound by the minimum 90% 
distribution rule. Investment strategy with real estate focus is adhered to by the REITs, but the 
quantum of real estate assets in the portfolios varies. Japanese REITs and Singaporean REITs 
must invest at least 75% and 70% of the total assets in real estate respectively, whereas in Hong 
Kong, REITs must hold 100% real estate in the portfolios. In Japan, REITs are not restrained in 
the use of debt to finance their investment activities. However, Singaporean REITs are subject to 
a 35% cap, or a 60% cap if a good rating is obtained from credit agencies, when using debt. 
Hong Kong REITs’ gearings are capped at 45%. REITs listed on the three Asian bourses enjoy 
tax transparency advantages at source.  
 
REOCs are not subject to the same restrictions imposed on REITs with respect to earning 
distributions, real estate holdings and leverage limits. However, they are not granted tax 
transparency. REOCs are actively involved in high risk real estate development activities. 
Whereas these activities are prohibited for Hong Kong REITs, REITs in Singapore and Japan 
cap these activities at 10% and 50% of their total assets, respectively. Broadly, we could identify 
REOCs firms as those engaged in real estate development activities, whereas REITs are real 
estate investment holding companies by the nature of their businesses.  
 
4. Data source and descriptive statistics 
 
4.1. Data sources 
 
Our study includes all publicly listed REITs and REOCs in the three markets of Japan, Singapore 
and Hong Kong. These firms are recorded in the SNL Financial database. As the REIT number 
in the three markets was small prior to 2005, our sample period covers only from 2006 to 2010. 
A total of 101 real estate firms comprising 38 REITs and 63 REOCs were included in our 
sample.7 Yearly data on financial statements, stock prices and NAV8 are collected, and they are 
                                                            
7  The list of sample firms could be made available upon request from the authors. 
8  It should be noted that NAV estimates of SNL Financials are consensus estimates collected from one or more 
analysts, and averages are then used for the sample REITs or REOCs. We cross-check the data against those 
reported in the financial statements for some real estate firms. Some firms did not report the NAV data. 
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used to derive empirical variables, which will be discussed in the next section. After removing 
some missing data, our final sample consists of 474 firm-year observations. The distributions of 
the sample REOCs and REITs in Table 1 show that REITs are highly popular in Singapore and 
Japan markets, where REITs outnumber REOCs. However, by total asset value in US$, Hong 
Kong listed real estate firms (both REOC and REIT) are larger with an average value of 
US$8.162 billion compared to US$3.227 billion and US$7.104 billion for the securitized real 
estate firms in Singapore and Japan, respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4.2. Derivations of variables 
 
The four key variables used in our empirical analyses are derived from the financial statements 
and stock price data, and are summarized as follows. 
 
a) Price/net asset value ratio (pnav) is defined as the ratio of price per share over the net 
asset value per share for a firm i:   
 
  ݌݊ܽݒ௜ ൌ ௉௥௜௖௘	௣௘௥	ௌ௛௔௥௘೔ே௘௧	஺௦௦௘௧	௏௔௟௨௘	௣௘௥	ௌ௛௔௥௘೔      (1) 
 
b) Debt ratio (totdebt) is defined as the ratio of total debt to total asset for firm i: 
 
ݐ݋ݐܾ݀݁ݐ௜ ൌ ்௢௧௔௟	஽௘௕௧೔்௢௧௔௟	஺௦௦௘௧௦೔       (2)  
 
c) Long-term debt ratio (ltdebt) is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total asset for 
firm i:   
 
݈ݐܾ݀݁ݐ௜ ൌ ௅௢௡௚ି்௘௥௠	஽௘௕௧೔்௢௧௔௟	஺௦௦௘௧௦೔        (3)  
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d) Short-term debt ratio (stdebt) is defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total asset 
ratio for firm i, where short-term debt is the difference between total debt and long-term 
debt:   
 
ݏݐܾ݀݁ݐ௜ ൌ ௌ௛௢௥௧ି௧௘௥௠	஽௘௕௧೔்௢௧௔௟	஺௦௦௘௧௦೔        (4) 
 
A firm-type dummy variable denoted as “reit” has a value of 1, if it is associated with a REIT, 
and a value of 0 if it is a REOC. The derivations of other financial variables for the empirical 
analyses are summarized in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for the empirical variables sorted by country, by year and firm type are 
summarized in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. The mean and standard deviation (in brackets) are 
reported. By country analysis, the results show that Japanese real estate firms (both REOCs and 
REITs) were traded at significant premiums to their NAV of 1.367 on average over the sample 
period from 2006 to 2010. Hong Kong listed real estate firms were traded at a discount of 0.917 
to the NAV on average over the same period, but they were the most profitable with the earnings 
before interest and tax (EBIT) on average of 5.872 times the total assets. The profitability was 
the lowest for average Japanese real estate firms, which was reported at an EBIT of 3.34 times of 
total asset. By dividend yields, Singaporean real estate firms offers the most attractive returns of 
5.217%, compared to 3.716% and 4.561% for comparable firms in Hong Kong and Japan 
respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Japanese listed real estate firms were generally more liberal in terms of debt gearing. The total 
debt ratio of the Japanese firms were 43.962% on average, of which 31.273% were in the form of 
long term debt, and the balance of 12.689% in short-term debt, over the period from 2006 to 
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2010. Hong Kong real estate firms were the most restrained in terms of borrowing with average 
firms levered up to a total of 20.869% of total asset value. Singapore’s REITs and REOCs 
borrowed about 30.963% on average of total asset value term, and they used a combination of 
22.641% long term debt and 8.322% of short-term debt over the same period. By interest 
expense to total asset ratio, the debt costs were the highest at 3.118% for Singaporean listed real 
estate firms. The high average values of fixed asset ratio in the books of Japanese (60.39%) and 
Singaporean (57.253%) real estate firms could indicate higher debt capacity due to the higher 
collaterals from fixed assets. 
 
We also compute the means and standard deviations for the key variables by year and by firm 
type (REITs versus REOCs) in Table 4. Figure 1 shows graphically the historical trends of price 
to NAV ratio (“pnav”) for both REOCs and REITs. They were both traded at discounts to NAV 
after 2008. The “pnav” indicator shows that REITs generally under-performed REOCs over the 
sample period, though the measures were unadjusted for risks. REIT stocks were more severely 
hit by the US subprime crisis in 2007, with their stocks being heavily discounted at only 63% of 
the valuation of their net assets on average. By the gearing ratio, REITs were more highly 
levered, ranging from 34.73% in 2007 to 36.27% in 2010 (Figure 2).  REOCs adopt a more 
conservative approach in leveraging, and the total debt ratio has declined to a low of 28.42% in 
2010, whereas the debt ratio of REITs has seen a slight upturn in 2010. REITs are generally 
attractive yield instruments for investors, where the highest average dividend yield was reported 
in 2008 at 11.643% vis-à-vis 4.554% for REOCs in the same year. However, REOCs generate 
higher EBIT averaging between 3.549 (2008) and 6.770 (2007), compared to REITs between 
4.197 (2008) and 3.860 (2007) over the sample period.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 
5. Empirical Methodology and Results 
 
The objective of our empirical analyses is two-fold. First, we examine the leveraging strategies 
of the two types of securitized real estate firms in our sample. Second, we test the effects of 
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leveraging strategies on price to NAV of the sample firms. We use the financial crisis periods 
during 2007 and 2008, i.e. [crisis=1], to test if firms’ leveraging strategies were affected by the 
financial crisis. We also test if highly leveraged real estate firms were more badly penalized by 
the stock markets during the crisis periods in 2007 and 2008 vis-à-vis other low leveraged 
control group of firms. The US subprime crisis occurred toward the last quarter of 2007. We 
separate the effects in 2007 and 2008 using two year dummies that are [y07 =1, if year = 2007; 0 
otherwise] and [y08 =1, if year =2008; 0 otherwise]. 
 
The empirical methodology is conducted in two stages. The first-stage model tests the 
determinants of firms’ leveraging strategies, [yi,t = totdebti,t, ltdebti,t, and stdebti,t], which is 
represented as:  
  
ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ࢄ′௜,௧ࢼ௜ ൅ ߜ௜ݎ݁݅ݐ௜ ൅ ߛ௜ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൅ ௜ሺݎ݁݅ݐ௜ ∗ ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ሻ൅௜ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧  
(5) 
 
where X’i,t is a vector of time-dependent covariates, which include interest expenses (intexp), 
fixed asset to total asset ratio (fassetr), log-size, and also two country dummy variables, [ses = 1, 
if firms are listed on Singapore Stock Exchange; and 0 otherwise] and [tks = 1, if firms are listed 
on Tokyo Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise]. These are adjusted either for fixed year effect or for 
fixed firm-type effect. A firm type dummy variable, “reit”, has a value of 1 if a sample firm is 
identified as a REIT, and 0 otherwise. “crisis” is a time dummy variable that indicates the effects 
of subprime crisis in the years 2007 and 2008. An interactive term, (reiti*crisist) is also included 
to test the joint effects of REIT firms’ leverage strategies in the crisis periods. We control for 
cross-sectional heterogeneity and time variations using the firm fixed effect, i, and the year 
fixed effects, t.  i, i, i, i and i are the regression coefficients and i,t is the i.i.d. regression 
error term.  
 
In the second-stage estimation, we use the instrumental variable (IV) approach to control for 
potential endogeneity between leverage and price/NAV variables. Any endogeneity in such a 
case will skew up as a contemporary correlation between pnavi,t and i,t. The specification for the 
IV model for predicting price/NAV is written as: 
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݌݊ܽݒ௜,௧ ൌ ௜ ൅ ࢄ′௜,௧ࢼ௜ᇱ ൅ ௜ܼ௜,௧ ൅ ߜ௜ݎ݁݅ݐ௜ ൅ ߛ௜ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ ൅ ௜ሺݎ݁݅ݐ௜ ∗ ܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௧ሻ൅௜ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ௜,௧   
(6) 
 
where the debt ratio vector, Zi,t, is an instrumental variable obtained by fitting yi,t to fixed asset 
ratio (fassetr), interest expense ratio (intexp), log size and its square term (logsize and logsize2) 
which are assumed to be independent of i,t and i,t. X’i,t are explanatory variables such as 
“divyld”, “profit” and “lnvol”. The models (13) to (23) in equation (6) are estimated using the 2-
stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable estimator.  
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1. Leveraging strategies 
The first-stage empirical model is to test whether REITs and REOCs adopt different leveraging 
strategies, and also whether they react differently to the impact of the subprime crisis, which is 
represented by a year dummy, “crisis” that has a value of 1, if [year = 2007, 2008] ; or 0 
otherwise. We also employ an interactive dummy variable of “crisis” and “reit” to test if REITs 
react to the financial shocks by switching their leverage behaviour vis-à-vis REOCs. We control 
for heterogeneity in the sample firms using exogenous variables like interest expense ratio, 
(“intexp”), fixed asset ratio (“fassetr”), log-size and its square in the model. We run models for 
the three different debt measures, [y2i,t = totdebti,t, ltdetbi,t, stdebti,t], with fixed firm effects, but 
alternating between with and without fixed year effects. The regression results are summarized in 
Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results in Models 1 and 2 show the total debt strategies of REITs and REOCs. When the 
fixed year effect is not controlled (Model 1), we found that the coefficient on “crisis” is positive 
and significant, which implies that total debt levels of real estate firms increase during the crisis 
periods in 2007 and 2008. However, when fixed year effects are included, we found that the total 
debt levels of REITs are significantly higher than those used by REOCs.  The negative and 
significant coefficient on the term (reit*crisis) shows that REIT did react more strongly by 
reducing their total debt levels relative to REOCs during the crisis periods. The results in Models 
3 and 4 show that there were no significant variations in terms of long-term debt borrowing by 
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the two real estate firms, both before and after the crisis periods. The long-term strategies of the 
firms were not, or less severely, affected by the transitory shocks of the financial crisis. For 
short-term debt, REITs use significantly higher levels of short-term debt compared to REOCs, 
and the financial crisis in 2007-2008.  
We also found that coefficients on the fixed asset ratio (“fassetr”) are all not significant implying 
that there are no collateral effects of these high real estate holding firms in increasing their debt 
levels. The log size effects were significant and positive in both total debt (“totdebti,t”) and long-
term debt (“ltdebti,t) models, which may capture some collateral effects that are not found in the 
fixed assets. The size effect is concave on long-term debt. Short-term debt (“stdebt”) is 
independent of the size of the firms, but is negatively correlated with the interest expenses. Real 
estate firms cut down the use of short-term debt when their interest costs are high. The country 
effects, which were controlled by “ses” (Singapore Stock Exchange) and tks (Tokyo Stock 
Exchange), were significant and positive, which imply that REITs and REOCs in the two 
markets were more highly geared in terms of total debt and long-term debt vis-à-vis real estate 
firms in Hong Kong. 
 
As the US subprime crisis escalated in the last quarter of 2007, the spill-over impact could have 
been more severely felt in 2008, if it rippled across to Asian bourses. We redefine the “crisis” by 
separating it into two year dummies that are “y07” and “y08” to separately capture the financial 
shocks in years 2007 and 2008, respectively. The results are summarized in Table 6, and we 
focus our discussion only on the “reit”, the two year dummies and their interactive terms. The 
results show that REITs have had higher total leverage levels (Model 8), and they also used more 
short-term debt to finance their investments (Models 11 and 12) compared to REOCs. The “y07” 
coefficient was negative in Model 8, which explains declines in overall total debt levels by real 
estate firms at the start of the crisis in 2007. New City Residence Investment failed because it did 
not adequately refinance the matured short-term debts, and this magnified its refinancing risks. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
6.2.  Leveraging and Price/NAV 
In stage two of the analyses, we study the impact of leveraging strategies on the P/NAV ratios of 
REIT and REOCs using the financial crisis as the treatment effect. As P/NAV and debt levels 
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may be potentially endogenous, we obtain an instrumental variable of the debt, (yi,t), using 
interest expense (“intexp”), fixed asset (“fassetr”), linear and non-linear size variables (“logsize” 
and “logsize2”).  
The regression results are summarized in Table 7. We found that the fundamental variable as 
represented by dividend yield (“divyld”) was significant in explaining the P/NAV variations, but 
the signs of the coefficient are negative. The stock volume, (“lnvol”), which is usually used as 
the proxy of investor sentiment in the behavioural finance literature, is significantly and 
positively correlated with P/NAV. The results could not rule out both fundamental and sentiment 
effects in driving the real estate stock prices in Asia. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Except for Models 13 and 17 where fixed firm effects are not controlled, the financial crisis in 
2007 and 2008 had significant and negative impact on the P/NAV of REITs and REOCs in the 
three Asian markets. REITs underperformed the REOCs when fixed firm effects are controlled 
(Models 14, 16 and 18).  The discount to P/NAV was even larger during the financial crisis for 
REITs relative to REOCs (Model 14).  
 
Next, we discuss the leveraging effects of REOCs and REITs on their P/NAVs. The coefficients 
on instrumental variable on fitted total debt (“totdebt”) and long-term debt (“ltdebt”) in fixed 
firm effects Models 14 and 16 were significant and negative implying that the high levered real 
estate firms were penalized by the stock market by having their stock prices discounted relative 
to their net asset values. The results were consistent with the findings of earlier studies using 
European property firm (Barkham and Ward, 1999; Ooi, 1999; Bond and Shilling, 2004; Brouner 
and ter-Laak, 2005).  However, interestingly, we found that the use of short-term debt increases 
P/NAV of real estate firms (Model 17). When we interact the debt variables with the “crisis” 
dummy, we find that total debt and long-term debt have positive impact on the P/NAV. 
However, short-term debt has negative impact on P/NAV, which means that real estate firms that 
had excessive short-term debts suffered under-valuation to their assets during the financial crisis. 
The positive coefficient of 0.068 during normal times reverses to -0.068 during the crisis. 
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We conduct further robustness tests by substituting the “crisis” dummy with two “y07” and 
“y08” dummies, and the 2LS with IV results are summarized in Table 8. The coefficients on 
dividend yields (“divyld”) and trading volume (“lnvol”) remain significant, and the signs are 
consistent with the earlier results. We also found that when both fixed year and fixed firm effects 
are controlled, real estate firms in Asia were trading significantly below their net asset values in 
the two years in 2007 and 2008, as shown by the negative coefficients on “y07” and “08”. The 
negative impact was higher in 2008 relative to 2007, when the financial crisis first broke out.  
The discounts to stock prices of REITs were relatively higher than stock prices of REOCs as 
indicated by the negative coefficient on the “reit” dummy (Models 20 and 22), and the discounts 
to P/NAV were higher in 2007 for REITs vis-à-vis the P/NAV of REOCs in 2007. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
The results of the leveraging effects on P/NAV were also consistent, which show that total debt 
and long-term debt levels have negative impact on the P/NAV of real estate firms. However, 
using short-term debt could increase P/NAV of the firms except during the crisis period where 
the adverse impact of using short-term debt was felt (Model 23). Real estate firms that relied on 
long-term debt in their financing strategies were better protected against the refinancing risks 
when the financial shocks occurred in 2007 and 2008. The P/NAV of highly leveraged firms, 
especially those that use more long-term debt, were valued positively by the stock markets, 
especially in 2007 (Models 20, 21, and 22). 
 
The results imply that real estate firms should be prudent in their leveraging strategies. Reliance 
on short-term debt could improve P/NAV in stable markets, but firms are more vulnerable to 
refinancing risks when liquidity is reduced during financial crisis such as the 2007-2008 credit 
crunch. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
REIT made the inroad into Asian public real estate markets in 2001. The REIT concept is 
relatively new to Asian investors, who have been used to the REOC model when investing in 
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indirect real estate. The co-existence of two real estate vehicles in Asia, however, offers a unique 
laboratory to test how managers of the two entities (REIT versus REOC) 9  choose their 
leveraging strategies in financing real estate investments. The subprime crisis in 2007 allows us 
to further test how the two real estate firms change their financing /refinancing strategies in 
response to the exogenous shock of credit crunch. The outcome of the leveraging strategies could 
be tested using the stock market valuation of their net assets.  
 
We use data for REITs and REOCs listed on the exchanges in Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan 
covering the sample period from 2006 to 2010. In contrary to the belief that REITs, being a tax-
exempt vehicle, favour equity over debt in their capital structure (Howe and Shilling, 1988), our 
results show that REITs use more debt, especially short-term debt, compared to REOCs. The 
total debt levels in real estate market increased during the 2007-2008 periods, but REITs reduced 
the debt levels in these periods. The price to NAV of real estate firms in general declined during 
the crisis period, but the P/NAV of REITs were discounted by a larger margin than REOCs 
firms. During normal times, real estate firms using more debt and/or long-term debt suffered 
bigger discounts to P/NAV. The effect of short-term debt on P/NAV was positive. The effects of 
long-term debt and short-term debt on P/NAV, however, reversed during the financial crisis. 
During a period of credit crunch, real estate firms using long-term debt had more favourable 
valuation to their assets, but those firms using more short-term debt fared badly in terms of 
P/NAV.  
 
The results have two implications for the leverage strategies of firms investing heavily in real 
estates, especially REITs. First, the borrowing constraints imposed on Hong Kong and 
Singaporean REITs do not seem to make them more conservative in their leveraging decisions. 
REITs borrow more than REOCs, which are not subject to any form of borrowing limits. REITs 
also take on more short-term debt to finance their real estate investments. The leveraging 
strategies of REITs expose them to high refinancing risks when facing a financing crunch. 
During normal times, the short-term debt has a positive impact on P/NAV for REITs, and they 
                                                            
9  REITs enjoy tax-exempt advantages, but are subject to distribution and borrowing (in Hong Kong and 
Singpaore) constraints; REOCs are taxable entity, but are allowed to keep free cash flows and use unlimited 
leverage to fund their real estate activities. 
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are used by REITs to support their growth and acquisition activities during the expansion phase. 
However, REITs with strong reliance on short-term debt face serious refinancing risks during a 
credit crunch, and they may be forced into bankruptcy when banks stop the credit facilities. The 
vulnerability of REITs that use short-term fund to finance long-term investment was evidenced 
in our tests, which show undervaluation of assets of REITs during the financial shocks. The 
implications are aptly summarized by a report of Fitch Ratings on Singaporean REITs, which 
was extracted below10: 
 
“SINGAPORE real estate investment trusts (S-Reits) are exposing themselves to various risks as they 
rely more and more on debt financing, a trend that is likely to continue this year.. 
The uncertainties include refinancing risk and exposure to interest-rate shocks, while the increasing 
use of debt in S-Reits' funding mixes stems from low interest rates and demand for dividend distribution 
amid falling asset yields... 
The availability of low-cost debt capital has led to the increasing use of debt to fund asset acquisitions, 
new developments, asset improvement programmes and unitholder payments.. 
.. and competition for assets that results from the use of leverage will put downward pressure on 
underlying asset yields. 
S-Reits have benefited from falling short-term interest rates in terms of funding costs over the past six 
years, but they may face issues with covering debt payments if rates normalise. 
Reits here generally have a weak liquidity profile because of a reliance on short-term debt citing as a 
reason the short-dated maturity of leases on commercial property, which limits funding options… 
In the event of a sudden move to higher interest rates, the gap between asset yields and interest rates 
would widen owing to the much slower pace at which asset yields are prone to self-correct.” 
 
 
 
  
   
                                                            
10  This report was extracted from the Business Times, by Ong Chor Hao, “S-REITs face risks from debt reliance: 
Fitch,” 19 March 2013. 
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    Table 1: Number of REITs and REOCs in Sample  
 
 Hong Kong Singapore Japan 
 REIT REOC REIT REOC REIT REOC 
2006 3 22 13 16 17 11 
2007 5 22 17 17 19 11 
2008 5 26 19 17 21 11 
2009 6 27 19 17 21 11 
2010 6 27 19 17 21 11 
Total 25 124 87 84 99 55 
Note: The table summarizes the number of REIT and REOC firms in our sample sorted by country and 
year.  The numbers are based on the records in the SNL database as on 2010.  
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Table 2: Definitions of Key Empirical Variables 
 
Price to net asset value ratio ݌݊ܽݒ௜ ൌ ௉௥௜௖௘ ௣௘௥ ௌ௛௔௥௘೔ே௘௧ ஺௦௦௘௧ ௏௔௟௨௘ ௣௘௥ ௌ௛௔௥௘೔   
Dividend yield ݀݅ݒݕ݈݀௜ ൌ ஽௜௩௜ௗ௘௡ௗ ௉௔௜ௗ೔ௌ௛௔௥௘ ௉௥௜௖௘೔   
Profitability measure ݌ݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜ ൌ ா௔௥௡௜௡௚௦ ௕௘௙௢௥௘ ூ௡௧௘௥௘௦௧ ௔௡ௗ ்௔௫೔்௢௧௔௟ ஺௦௦௘௧௦೔   
Total debt ratio ݐ݋ݐܾ݀݁ݐ௜ ൌ ்௢௧௔௟ ஽௘௕௧೔்௢௧௔௟ ஺௦௦௘௧௦೔  
Long-term debt ratio ݈ݐܾ݀݁ݐ௜ ൌ ௅௢௡௚ି்௘௥௠ ஽௘௕௧೔்௢௧௔௟ ஺௦௦௘௧௦೔   
Short-term debt ratio ݏݐܾ݀݁ݐ௜ ൌ ௌ௛௢௥௧ି௧௘௥௠ ஽௘௕௧೔்௢௧௔௟ ஺௦௦௘௧௦೔   
Interest expense ratio ݅݊ݐ݁ݔ݌௜ ൌ ்௢௧௔௟ ூ௡௧௘௥௘௦௧ ா௫௣௘௡௦௘೔்௢௧௔௟ ஽௘௕௧೔   
Fixed asset ratio ݂ܽݏݏ݁ݐݎ௜ ൌ ி௜௫௘ௗ ஺௦௦௘௧௦೔்௢௧௔௟ ஺௦௦௘௧௦೔     
Log of total asset  ݈݊ݏ݅ݖ݁௜ ൌ logሺܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ ݅݊ ݄ܶ݋ݑݏܽ݊݀ݏ௜ሻ  
Log of trading volume  ݈݊ݒ݋݈௜ ൌ logሺܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁ ܶݎܽ݊ݏܽܿݐ݁݀ ݅݊ ݄ܶ݋ݑݏܽ݊݀ݏ௜ 	ൈ ܲݎ݅ܿ݁	݌݁ݎ ݄ܵܽݎ݁௜ሻ 
Firm type dummy  reit = 1, if a firm is a REIT,  and 0, if a firm is a  REOC 
Crisis period dummy crisis =  1, if the year is 2007 and 2008, and 0 otherwise  
Note: The table gives the descriptions, symbols and definitions of variables that are used in the empirical models.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics by Country 
 
  Country  
Variable name Code Hong Kong Singapore Japan All 
Price to net asset value ratio pnav 0.917 1.051 1.367 1.111 
  (0.709) (0.549) (1.048) (0.810) 
Dividend yield divyld 3.716 5.217 4.561 4.532 
  (3.760) (5.628) (3.598) (4.514) 
Profitability measure profit 5.872 5.110 3.340 4.783 
  (5.509) (3.229) (1.880) (3.942) 
Total debt ratio totdebt 20.869 30.963 43.962 32.013 
  (10.635) (11.677) (9.945) (14.227) 
Long-term debt ratio ltdebt 16.542 22.641 31.273 23.528 
  (9.751) (10.635) (10.286) (11.824) 
Short-term debt ratio stdebt 4.327 8.322 12.689 8.485 
  (5.682) (9.141) (8.679) (8.701) 
Interest expense ratio intexp 2.332 3.118 1.409 2.321 
  (1.567) (2.274) (0.295) (1.781) 
Fixed asset ratio fassetr 48.953 57.253 60.390 55.663 
  (30.424) (37.121) (37.253) (35.442) 
Log of total asset  lnsize 6.638 6.267 6.554 6.477 
  (0.503) (0.437) (0.474) (0.496) 
Log of trading volume of stock lnvol 5.997 5.563 6.132 5.884 
  (0.807) (0.654) (0.732) (0.769) 
Firm type dummy 
 (1= REIT, 0 = REOC) 
reit 0.168 0.509 0.643 0.445 
 (0.375) (0.501) (0.481) (0.498) 
Note: The table summarizes the descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) of the key variables sorted by 
country. The means and standard deviations for the full sample are shown in the last column. The numbers in 
parentheses are standard deviations 
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Table 4: Historical Trends by Firm Type 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Variable REIT REOC REIT REOC REIT REOC REIT REOC REIT REOC 
pnav 1.541 2.002 1.148 1.583 0.635 0.724 0.802 0.986 0.879 0.952 
 (0.531) (1.600) (0.460) (0.861) (0.334) (0.446) (0.250) (0.526) (0.249) (0.504) 
divyld 2.953 1.703 4.656 1.750 11.643 4.554 9.120 1.993 6.126 1.966 
 (1.626) (1.228) (2.204) (1.064) (6.052) (3.882) (5.776) (1.330) (2.123) (1.222) 
profit 3.181 6.305 3.860 6.770 4.197 3.549 3.593 4.984 3.786 6.657 
 (0.985) (3.178) (2.225) (3.018) (3.095) (5.616) (1.574) (4.291) (1.444) (6.220) 
totdebt 35.840 29.894 34.732 29.303 35.787 29.740 35.637 28.190 36.267 28.422 
 (10.437) (14.856) (12.096) (15.409) (11.846) (16.385) (10.488) (16.283) (11.460) (15.721) 
ltdebt 25.609 23.356 25.065 22.486 25.504 22.346 24.370 21.638 26.096 20.820 
 (11.010) (11.466) (10.803) (12.325) (12.129) (11.619) (11.382) (13.158) (10.791) (12.400) 
stdebt 10.231 6.538 9.667 6.817 10.284 7.394 11.267 6.552 10.171 7.602 
 (12.851) (6.490) (10.504) (5.369) (9.625) (7.044) (11.185) (5.412) (10.832) (6.163) 
intexp 1.979 3.146 2.793 2.795 2.334 2.360 2.307 1.738 2.230 1.612 
 (1.252) (1.776) (3.762) (1.643) (1.064) (1.664) (1.078) (1.267) (1.049) (1.420) 
fassetr 82.809 51.370 63.623 49.678 62.045 46.895 59.348 47.044 59.465 48.453 
 (31.081) (26.423) (43.816) (26.438) (44.249) (26.581) (43.942) (26.601) (44.345) (26.412) 
lnsize 6.116 6.560 6.202 6.679 6.225 6.661 6.253 6.677 6.346 6.760 
 (0.343) (0.511) (0.323) (0.494) (0.338) (0.529) (0.341) (0.535) (0.330) (0.518) 
lnvol 5.700 6.071 5.912 6.259 5.658 6.010 5.572 5.925 5.668 5.931 
 (0.536) (0.822) (0.488) (0.788) (0.540) (1.001) (0.539) (0.927) (0.490) (0.886) 
Note: The numbers indicate the means of the variables in each year and across the countries. The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations 
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Table 5: Baseline Models on Determinants of Leveraging Strategies  
 
 Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent  
variable, yi,t 
totdebt totdebt ltdebt ltdebt stdebt stdebt 
intexp -0.266 -0.396** 0.198 0.109 -0.465* -0.506* 
 (0.198) (0.200) (0.287) (0.296) (0.278) (0.289) 
fassetr 0.071 0.053 0.078 0.065 -0.007 -0.012 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065) 
lnsize 26.722** 35.839*** 34.037** 40.347** -7.314 -4.508 
 (11.202) (11.191) (16.207) (16.564) (15.743) (16.165) 
lnsize2 -1.235 -1.054 -2.152* -2.053* 0.917 0.999 
 (0.836) (0.818) (1.209) (1.211) (1.174) (1.182) 
reit 7.334 15.690*** -5.677 -0.255 13.011* 15.945* 
 (5.317) (5.639) (7.693) (8.347) (7.472) (8.146) 
reit*crisis -1.587 -1.590* -1.193 -1.200 -0.394 -0.390 
 (0.966) (0.942) (1.397) (1.394) (1.357) (1.361) 
crisis 1.135* -1.164 0.794 -0.783 0.341 -0.381 
 (0.653) (1.083) (0.944) (1.602) (0.917) (1.564) 
ses 40.808*** 54.758*** 27.985*** 37.326*** 12.823 17.432* 
 (6.328) (7.290) (9.156) (10.790) (8.894) (10.530) 
tks 39.576*** 48.315*** 31.019*** 36.898*** 8.557 11.418 
 (4.800) (5.246) (6.945) (7.766) (6.746) (7.579) 
Constant -119.135*** -195.105*** -126.348** -177.438*** 7.214 -17.667 
 (39.314) (43.309) (56.880) (64.105) (55.251) (62.561) 
Fixed year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Fixed firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.876 0.882 0.624 0.625 0.346 0.343 
RSS 9157 8638 19167 18926 18085 18025 
MSS 86011 86529 46628 46870 17658 17717 
RMSE 5.022 4.899 7.267 7.251 7.058 7.076 
F-Stats. 32.17 33.08 8.331 8.179 3.344 3.246 
Note: The table summarizes the panel regression results with fixed firm and fixed year effects. The dependent 
variables include total debt (totdebt), long-term debt (ltdebt) and short-term debt (stdebt). The explanatory 
variables include interest expense ratio (intexp), fixed asset ratio (fassetr), size (lnsize) and the non-linear term 
(lnsize2). We also include a firm-type dummy (reit), an interactive term (reit*crisis), where crisis is a time 
dummy to identify the credit crunch effects in 2007 and 2008. The country effect is controlled by the two 
dummies on Singapore Stock Exchange (ses) and Tokyo Stock Exchange (tks). The models are control for fixed-
year (2006 to 2010) and fixed firm effects. The first raw for each variable shows the regression coefficients, and 
the standard errors are given in parentheses. ‘***’ denote 1% significance, ‘**’ denotes 5% significance and ‘*’ 
denote 10% significance.  
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Table 6: Regressions on Leveraging with Financial Crisis  
 
 Model (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent  variable, yi,t totdebt totdebt ltdebt ltdebt stdebt stdebt 
intexp -0.216 -0.397** 0.233 0.109 -0.449 -0.506* 
 (0.198) (0.200) (0.289) (0.296) (0.281) (0.289) 
fassetr 0.073 0.054 0.080 0.065 -0.007 -0.011 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065) 
lnsize 26.630** 36.098*** 33.864** 40.402** -7.234 -4.303 
 (11.173) (11.243) (16.269) (16.644) (15.826) (16.242) 
lnsize2 -1.265 -1.070 -2.165* -2.056* 0.900 0.986 
 (0.833) (0.821) (1.213) (1.216) (1.180) (1.186) 
reit 7.171 15.752*** -5.807 -0.242 12.978* 15.994* 
 (5.290) (5.651) (7.703) (8.365) (7.493) (8.163) 
reit*y07 -1.505 -1.378 -1.235 -1.155 -0.270 -0.223 
 (1.228) (1.207) (1.789) (1.786) (1.740) (1.743) 
reit*y08 -1.699 -1.785 -1.179 -1.241 -0.520 -0.544 
 (1.192) (1.171) (1.736) (1.734) (1.689) (1.692) 
y07 0.118 -2.484** 0.140 -1.651 -0.021 -0.834 
 (0.833) (1.059) (1.213) (1.568) (1.180) (1.530) 
y08 2.018** -1.083 1.358 -0.765 0.660 -0.318 
 (0.802) (1.121) (1.168) (1.660) (1.136) (1.620) 
ses 39.685*** 54.822*** 27.204*** 37.340*** 12.481 17.482* 
 (6.311) (7.303) (9.190) (10.810) (8.939) (10.550) 
tks 39.065*** 48.310*** 30.682*** 36.897*** 8.382 11.413 
 (4.779) (5.253) (6.959) (7.776) (6.770) (7.589) 
Constant -116.803*** -196.158*** -124.356** -177.660*** 7.553 -18.498 
 (39.231) (43.526) (57.127) (64.433) (55.570) (62.879) 
Fixed year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Fixed firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.877 0.881 0.623 0.624 0.343 0.341 
RSS 9006 8637 19096 18926 18070 18024 
MSS 86161 86531 46699 46870 17673 17719 
RMSE 4.995 4.905 7.273 7.261 7.075 7.086 
F-Stats. 31.98 32.70 8.174 8.082 3.269 3.208 
Note: The table summarizes the panel regression results with fixed firm and fixed year effects. The dependent 
variables include total debt (totdebt), long-term debt (ltdebt) and short-term debt (stdebt). The explanatory 
variables include interest expense ratio (intexp), fixed asset ratio (fassetr), size (lnsize) and the non-linear term 
(lnsize2). We also include a firm-type dummy (reit), and interactive terms (reit*y07) and (reit*y08), where y07 
and y08 are two year dummies that represent 2007 and 2008 respectively. The country effect is controlled by the 
two dummies on Singapore Stock Exchange (ses) and Tokyo Stock Exchange (tks). The models are control for 
fixed-year (2006 to 2010) and fixed firm effects. The first raw for each variable shows the regression coefficients, 
and the standard errors are given in parentheses. ‘***’ denote 1% significance, ‘**’ denotes 5% significance 
and ‘*’ denote 10% significance.  
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Table 7: Relationships between P/NAV and Leverage of REITs and REOCs 
 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Debt variables, i= totdebt totdebt ltdebt ltdebt stdebt stdebt 
divyld -0.023* 0.004 -0.024*** -0.020* -0.046*** 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.022) 
profit 0.017 -0.005 0.008 -0.003 0.020** 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
lnvol 0.276*** 0.286** 0.301*** 0.208 0.314*** 0.342** 
 (0.039) (0.119) (0.045) (0.155) (0.051) (0.135) 
ses 0.335 4.594*** 0.484*** 4.162*** 0.254** 2.730*** 
 (0.209) (0.691) (0.117) (0.801) (0.099) (0.652) 
tks 0.468 4.909*** 0.751*** 4.544*** 0.109 2.560*** 
 (0.462) (0.645) (0.187) (0.734) (0.204) (0.416) 
crisis -0.722 -1.120*** -1.418*** -1.546*** -0.299 -1.343*** 
 (0.652) (0.155) (0.378) (0.257) (0.273) (0.480) 
reit -0.128 -2.451*** -0.112 -3.122*** -0.127 -1.290* 
 (0.085) (0.370) (0.093) (0.563) (0.106) (0.755) 
reit*crisis -0.031 -0.178* -0.128 -0.181 0.186 -0.221 
 (0.172) (0.102) (0.128) (0.126) (0.171) (0.255) 
i 0.003 -0.070*** -0.029 -0.078*** 0.068** -0.072 
 (0.028) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.031) (0.081) 
i *crisis -0.005 0.008* 0.024 0.030*** -0.068** 0.047 
 (0.020) (0.004) (0.016) (0.011) (0.028) (0.062) 
Constant -0.225 0.545 0.300 1.094 -0.731* -0.569 
 (0.685) (0.946) (0.391) (1.250) (0.401) (1.081) 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed firm effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.425 0.476 0.277 0.155 0.0859 0.332 
Chi2 368.1 875.3 294.7 541.3 237.3 670.4 
MSS 118.9 161.7 80.07 95.29 30.00 131.8 
RMSE 0.567 0.480 0.635 0.609 0.714 0.542 
 
Note: The table summarizes the panel regression results with the price over net asset value (pnav) as the 
dependent variable. We test the leveraging effects using different debt variables, i,t, which include total debt 
(totdebt), long-term debt (ltdebt) and short-term debt (stdebt), and the interactive term with the crisis effects. The 
“crisis” is a time dummy that identifies the credit crunch effects in 2007 and 2008. Other explanatory variables 
include interest expense ratio (intexp), fixed asset ratio (fassetr), size (lnsize) and the non-linear term (lnsize2). 
The country effect is controlled by the two dummies on Singapore Stock Exchange (ses) and Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (tks). The models are control for fixed-year (2006 to 2010) and fixed firm effects. The first raw for 
each variable shows the regression coefficients, and the standard errors are given in parentheses. ‘***’ denote 
1% significance, ‘**’ denotes 5% significance and ‘*’ denote 10% significance.  
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 Table 8: Regression of P/NAV on Leverage and Financial Crisis Periods 
 Model (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Debt variables, i= totdebt totdebt ltdebt ltdebt stdebt stdebt 
divyld -0.028** -0.001 -0.029*** -0.027** -0.052*** 0.015 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.028) 
profit 0.015 -0.008 0.005 -0.007 0.017* -0.001 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
lnvol 0.274*** 0.267** 0.299*** 0.210 0.314*** 0.325** 
 (0.039) (0.121) (0.045) (0.153) (0.051) (0.163) 
ses 0.311 4.630*** 0.478*** 4.112*** 0.242** 2.807*** 
 (0.208) (0.688) (0.116) (0.782) (0.101) (0.770) 
tks 0.407 4.970*** 0.733*** 4.494*** 0.073 2.606*** 
 (0.460) (0.640) (0.187) (0.712) (0.213) (0.491) 
y07 -0.202 -0.723*** -0.893** -1.080*** 0.196 -0.853 
 (0.602) (0.185) (0.379) (0.284) (0.255) (0.556) 
y08 -0.628 -1.034*** -1.429*** -1.488*** -0.359 -1.490*** 
 (0.659) (0.167) (0.398) (0.264) (0.270) (0.523) 
reit -0.110 -2.458*** -0.093 -3.055*** -0.108 -1.103 
 (0.085) (0.371) (0.093) (0.549) (0.108) (0.867) 
reit*y07 -0.240 -0.405*** -0.349** -0.434*** -0.060 -0.444 
 (0.185) (0.128) (0.163) (0.160) (0.197) (0.278) 
reit*y08 0.197 0.030 0.090 0.074 0.444** -0.157 
 (0.198) (0.126) (0.158) (0.151) (0.216) (0.363) 
i  0.005 -0.072*** -0.029 -0.077*** 0.072** -0.099 
 (0.027) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.032) (0.096) 
I *y07 -0.003 0.014*** 0.027* 0.035*** -0.069** 0.076 
 (0.020) (0.006) (0.016) (0.012) (0.031) (0.079) 
i *y08 -0.010 0.003 0.021 0.025** -0.071** 0.060 
 (0.020) (0.005) (0.016) (0.011) (0.028) (0.070) 
Constant -0.261 0.751 0.336 1.098 -0.721* -0.314 
 (0.681) (0.956) (0.391) (1.228) (0.404) (1.328) 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed firm effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.432 0.471 0.282 0.178 0.0603 0.0549 
Chi2 381.2 882.2 303.0 564.9 235.7 480.9 
MSS 121.4 161.2 82.28 101.0 24.39 75.69 
RMSE 0.562 0.481 0.632 0.599 0.723 0.643 
Note: The table summarizes the panel regression results with the price over net asset value (pnav) as the 
dependent variable. We test the leveraging effects using different debt variables, i,t, which include total debt 
(totdebt), long-term debt (ltdebt) and short-term debt (stdebt), and the interactive term with the year effects. The 
two year dummies, y07 and y08, are included, which represent 2007 and 2008 respectively. Other explanatory 
variables include interest expense ratio (intexp), fixed asset ratio (fassetr), size (lnsize) and the non-linear term 
(lnsize2). The country effect is controlled by the two dummies on Singapore Stock Exchange (ses) and Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (tks). The models are control for fixed-year (2006 to 2010) and fixed firm effects. The first raw 
for each variable shows the regression coefficients, and the standard errors are given in parentheses. ‘***’ 
denote 1% significance, ‘**’ denotes 5% significance and ‘*’ denote 10% significance.  
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Figure 1: Historical Trends of P/NAV of all REITs and REOCs 
 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the mean price to net asset ratio sorted by the firm-type across the sample year 
from 2006 to 2010.  
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Figure 2: Historical Mean Total Debt to Total Asset Ratios of all REITs and REOCs 
 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the mean total debt to total asset ratio sorted by the firm-type across the 
sample year from 2006 to 2010. 
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Appendix1: Summary of key requirements for REITs 
 
  Japan Singapore Hong Kong 
 Legal Entity Trust or corporate (listed REITs 
are all corporations) 
Collective Investment scheme (Unit 
trust) or corporate 
Unit Trust 
 Management Structure External External External/Internal 
 % invested in real estate For listed J-REITs, at least 75% 
of assets must be invested in real 
estate 
At least 70% of deposited property 
should be invested in real estate or 
real estate-related assets 
Investment only in real estate 
 Property developments Restriction that at least 50% of 
total assets are income producing 
and unlikely be sold within one 
year 
Property developments and 
investments in uncompleted 
projects should not exceed 10%. 
Prohibited, but H-REIT may 
acquire uncompleted units 
comprising less than 10% 
NAV. 
 Leverage No restriction Over 35% of total assets permitted 
with disclosed credit rating (capped 
at 60%) 
Capped at 45% of gross asset 
value 
 Dividend Distribution At least 90% to qualify for tax 
deduction 
At least 90% At least 90% of annual net 
income after tax 
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Appendix 2: List of REITs and REOCs 
 
Company Trading Code Country TYPE 
1. Prosperity Real Estate Investment Trust HKG: 0808 Hong Kong REIT 
2. Link Real Estate Investment Trust HKG: 0823 Hong Kong REIT 
3. Champion Real Estate Investment Trust HKG: 2778 Hong Kong REIT 
4. Regal Real Estate Investment Trust HKG: 1881 Hong Kong REIT 
5. Sunlight Real Estate Investment Trust HKG: 0435 Hong Kong REIT 
6. Yuexiu Real Estate Investment Trust HKG: 0405 Hong Kong REIT 
7. Nippon Building Fund Incorporation TKS: 8951 Japan REIT 
8. Japan Real Estate Investment Corporation TKS: 8952 Japan REIT 
9. Japan Retail Fund Investment Corporation TKS: 8953 Japan REIT 
10. ORIX JREIT Inc. TKS: 8954 Japan REIT 
11. Japan Prime Realty Investment Corporation TKS: 8955 Japan REIT 
12. Tokyu REIT, Inc. TKS: 8957 Japan REIT 
13. Global One Real Estate Investment Corporation TKS: 8958 Japan REIT 
14. Nomura Real Estate Office Fund, Inc. TKS: 8959 Japan REIT 
15. United Urban Investment Corporation TKS: 8960 Japan REIT 
16. MORI TRUST Sogo Reit, Incorporation TKS: 8961 Japan REIT 
17. Invincible Investment Corporation TKS: 8963 Japan REIT 
18. Frontier Real Estate Investment Corporation TKS: 8964 Japan REIT 
19. Japan Logistics Fund, Inc. TKS: 8967 Japan REIT 
20. Kenedix Realty Investment Corporation TKS: 8972 Japan REIT 
21. Fukuoka REIT Corporation TKS: 8968 Japan REIT 
22. Japan Excellent, Inc. TKS: 8987 Japan REIT 
23. Japan Rental Housing Investments Inc. TKS: 8986 Japan REIT 
24. MID REIT, Inc. TKS: 3227 Japan REIT 
25. Mori Hills REIT Investment Corporation TKS: 3234 Japan REIT 
26. Premier Investment Corporation TKS: 8956 Japan REIT 
27. Hankyu REIT Inc. TKS: 8977 Japan REIT 
28. Ascendas Real Estate Investment Trust SES: A17U Singapore REIT 
29. Ascott Residence Trust SES: A68U Singapore REIT 
30. CapitaMall Trust SES: C38U Singapore REIT 
31. CapitaCommercial Trust SES: C61U Singapore REIT 
32. Fortune REIT SES: F25U Singapore REIT 
33. Frasers Centrepoint Trust SES: J69U Singapore REIT 
34. CDL Hospitality Trusts SES: J85 Singapore REIT 
35. Cambridge Industrial Trust SES: J91U Singapore REIT 
36. K-REIT Asia SES: K71U Singapore REIT 
37. Mapletree Logistics Trust SES: M44U Singapore REIT 
38. Frasers Commercial Trust SES: ND8U Singapore REIT 
39. Starhill Global Real Estate Investment Trust SES: P40U Singapore REIT 
40. Suntec Real Estate Investment Trust SES: T82U Singapore REIT 
41. CapitaRetail China Trust SES: AU8U Singapore REIT 
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42. First Real Estate Investment Trust SES: AW9U Singapore REIT 
43. Parkway Life REIT SES: C2PU Singapore REIT 
44. Ascendas India Trust SES: CY6U Singapore REIT 
45. Lippo Malls Indonesia Retail Trust SES: D5IU Singapore REIT 
46. Saizen Real Estate Investment Trust SES: DZ8U Singapore REIT 
47. Cheung Kong Holdings Limited HKG: 0001 Hong Kong REOCs 
48. Wharf (Holdings) Limited HKG: 0004 Hong Kong REOCs 
49. Hang Lung Group Limited HKG: 0010 Hong Kong REOCs 
50. Henderson Land Development Company Limited HKG: 0012 Hong Kong REOCs 
51. Hysan Development Company Limited HKG: 0014 Hong Kong REOCs 
52. Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited HKG: 0016 Hong Kong REOCs 
53. Kowloon Development Company Limited HKG: 0034 Hong Kong REOCs 
54. Far East Consortium International Limited HKG: 0035 Hong Kong REOCs 
55. Great Eagle Holdings Limited HKG: 0041 Hong Kong REOCs 
56. Hongkong and Shanghai Hotels, Limited HKG: 0045 Hong Kong REOCs 
57. Harbour Centre Development Limited HKG: 0051 Hong Kong REOCs 
58. Hopewell Holdings Limited HKG: 0054 Hong Kong REOCs 
59. Shangri-La Asia Limited HKG: 0069 Hong Kong REOCs 
60. Regal Hotels International Holdings Limited HKG: 0078 Hong Kong REOCs 
61. Sino Land Company Limited HKG: 0083 Hong Kong REOCs 
62. Hang Lung Properties Limited HKG: 0101 Hong Kong REOCs 
63. Chinese Estates Holdings Limited HKG: 0127 Hong Kong REOCs 
64. Asia Standard International Group Limited HKG: 0129 Hong Kong REOCs 
65. Hon Kwok Land Investment Company Limited HKG: 0160 Hong Kong REOCs 
66. Century City International Holdings Limited HKG: 0355 Hong Kong REOCs 
67. HKR International Limited HKG: 0480 Hong Kong REOCs 
68. Lai Sun Development Company Limited HKG: 0488 Hong Kong REOCs 
69. Shenzhen Investment Limited HKG: 0604 Hong Kong REOCs 
70. Paliburg Holdings Limited HKG: 0617 Hong Kong REOCs 
71. Kerry Properties Limited HKG: 0683 Hong Kong REOCs 
72. China Overseas Land & Investment Limited HKG: 0688 Hong Kong REOCs 
73. Hopson Development Holdings Limited HKG: 0754 Hong Kong REOCs 
74. Nomura Real Estate Holdings, Inc. TKS: 3231 Japan REOCs 
75. Mitsui Fudosan Company Limited TKS: 8801 Japan REOCs 
76. Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd. TKS: 8802 Japan REOCs 
77. Heiwa Real Estate Co., Ltd. TKS: 8803 Japan REOCs 
78. Tokyo Tatemono Co., Ltd. TKS: 8804 Japan REOCs 
79. Daibiru Corporation TKS: 8806 Japan REOCs 
80. Tokyu Land Corporation TKS: 8815 Japan REOCs 
81. Sumitomo Realty & Development Co., Ltd. TKS: 8830 Japan REOCs 
82. Daikyo Incorporated TKS: 8840 Japan REOCs 
83. AEON Mall Co., Ltd. TKS: 8905 Japan REOCs 
84. NTT Urban Development Corporation TKS: 8933 Japan REOCs 
85. Amara Holdings Limited SES: A34 Singapore REOCs 
86. GuocoLeisure Limited SES: B16 Singapore REOCs 
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87. Banyan Tree Holdings Limited SES: B58 Singapore REOCs 
88. City Developments Limited SES: C09 Singapore REOCs 
89. CapitaLand Limited SES: C31 Singapore REOCs 
90. GuocoLand Limited SES: F17 Singapore REOCs 
91. Stamford Land Corporation Limited SES: H07 Singapore REOCs 
92. Ho Bee Investment Limited SES: H13 Singapore REOCs 
93. Hotel Properties Limited SES: H15 Singapore REOCs 
94. Hongkong Land Holdings Limited SES: H78 Singapore REOCs 
95. Keppel Land Limited SES: K17 Singapore REOCs 
96. Overseas Union Enterprise Limited SES: LJ3 Singapore REOCs 
97. Mandarin Oriental International Limited SES: M04 Singapore REOCs 
98. Singapore Land Limited SES: S30 Singapore REOCs 
99. United Industrial Corporation Limited SES: U06 Singapore REOCs 
100. UOL Group Limited SES: U14 Singapore REOCs 
101. Wing Tai Holdings Limited SES: W05 Singapore REOCs 
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